

# SPEECH

OF

## HON. SOLON BORLAND, OF ARKANSAS,

UPON THE DEFICIENCY BILL—REVIEWING THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND EXPOSING THE LAWLESS AND WASTEFUL EXTRAVAGANCE OF THE WHIG ADMINISTRATION.

DELIVERED

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 27, 1852.

*"Resolved, That it is the duty of every branch of the Government to enforce and practice the most rigid economy in conducting our public affairs, and that no more revenue ought to be raised than is required to defray the necessary expenses of the Government, and for the gradual but certain extinction of the public debt."*

*"Resolved, That the war with Mexico, upon all the principles of patriotism and the laws of nations, was a just and necessary war on our part, in which every American citizen should have shown himself on the side of his country, and neither morally nor physically, by word or deed, have given aid and comfort to the enemy."*—Democratic Platform.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the consideration of the bill from the House of Representatives entitled "An act to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the service of the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1852;" Mr. CHASE's proposed amendment, in respect to the Collins line of steamers being under consideration—

Mr. BORLAND said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: If it be in order, as I presume it is, to discuss the whole bill upon any single amendment, I propose now to discuss this so-called deficiency bill.

The body of my remarks will be directed against the whole bill—its general character and policy—in the course of which I shall undertake to show, by facts and figures, furnished by the official records, that all such bills, and *this one in particular*, are in violation of sound constitutional principles, and dangerous to the best interests of the country.

First, and in general terms, I would remark, that, wrong in principle, and mischievous in practice, as I have, heretofore, endeavored to show, and as I honestly believe this matter of the Collins line to be, it is certainly not the only bad feature in this bill; nor am I sure it is the worst. Even remove this "damned spot" from it; yet so many more such spots remain—indeed, its whole structure, and the very source and occasion from which it sprung, are all so fraught with evil in themselves, and with danger as a precedent, that I would as soon take a leper to my bosom as to vote for it, amend it as you might, as long as any portion of that structure remains, or the taint of its source attaches to it.

Sir, in view of several features of this bill, acquired since it left the other House, and especially in view of the proposed amendment for the Collins line, it would seem that the two Houses were engaged, latterly, in "a game of brag" with the public money. But the other day we sent the House of Representatives a bill of \$10,000, for some work upon the Capitol, and it was returned to us magnified to \$500,000! Now, the House of

of Representatives have sent us a bill of some \$3,000,000, to supply certain deficiencies resulting from Executive usurpation and extravagance, and we are about to return it, as a sort of *omnibus*, crammed with some \$10,000,000, for almost every purpose of reckless prodigality. At such a rate, we shall certainly out-brag the House, and win the game. But it will be a triumph from which the country can derive neither honor nor profit, and over which no sound Democrat can rejoice. Progress I am in favor of; but this is progress in the wrong direction, and must end in ruin if persisted in.

It is hardly necessary for me to repeat, as I have taken more than one occasion here to say, that, alike upon principle and in policy, I am opposed to all deficiency bills—especially to such as it has of late become a fashion of the Federal Executive to urge upon us.

Let them come when, or how, or whence, or in whatever shape, or upon what pretext, they may, it may be safely assumed, as a general proposition, that some public wrong lies at the bottom of them; and that wrong will be found either in a disregard of some sound principle of legislation, or in some still more vicious Executive usurpation of authority; or, at best, in some neglect or recklessness in the administration of the Government. Except from some one of these causes, or perhaps from all of them combined, it must be rare, indeed, that a deficiency bill can become necessary. I assume it as a general proposition, to which there can, possibly, be but few, and rare, and inconsiderable exceptions, that if the constitutional requirement, once the wise and safe rule of action here and with the Executive, be observed, to limit the administrative operations and pecuniary expenditures of the Government, by specific appropriations, to each branch of the public service, there can be no occasion for such bills as these.

I can well understand the origin, and the necessity, of exceptions such as I have indicated. I



can understand, also, and appreciate, the circumstances which may make it not only allowable for the Executive to send us a deficiency bill, but our duty, at the same time, to pass it without hesitation or delay. Thus, sudden and unexpected hostile collision with a foreign nation, or with our Indian tribes, or the exigencies of an existing state of war, or the breaking out of some domestic insurrection or civil commotion, (possible, though not probable,)—all, or either, of these causes requiring the prompt action of the Executive, without time or opportunity for legislative counsel or co-operation, and yet involving the necessity of expending money not provided by prior appropriations, would make a case of legitimate deficiency, for which we should provide the very instant it were brought to our notice. And, if we may suppose such an instance—even should there be an accidental miscalculation of amounts, or the inadvertent omission, on the part of the Executive, or of Congress, of any specific appropriation for some necessary purpose—they, too, or either of them, would constitute a legitimate deficiency, demanding our prompt action to supply it. So much is due to the true interest and good faith of the Government—perhaps to its very preservation. Of this kind, and in this sense, deficiency bills, though to be always avoided if practicable, and closely scrutinized whenever presented, cannot be disapproved—certainly never rejected. Such, indeed, and such alone, properly speaking, are “deficiency bills.” It is not, and never will be, to such that I make objections.

But, Mr. President, how do the “deficiency bills”—so called, which this Administration has sent to us—that of last Congress, and especially this—conform to the very comprehensive and liberal conditions I have suggested? In the one now before us, there may be some two or three items—but each of them small—which may be regarded as a true deficiency. I doubt whether, since the rejection of the one presented by my colleague [Mr. SEBASTIAN] the other day, there be a single item, in the whole bill, which can really be considered a deficiency, in the true sense of the term. That amendment of my colleague, I take occasion now to repeat, was a proposition to redeem the plighted faith of the Government in furnishing the additional amount necessary to pay a recognized and liquidated debt which had been paid in part as far back as 1817, and the balance of which has been due ever since—now thirty-five years. That, as I remarked at the time, was the only real deficiency before us.

But the majority of these items, and all the large ones, are destitute of the first feature of a legitimate deficiency. I need not go into particulars to show this, for I think it has been sufficiently done already by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. HUNTER] and the Senator from California, [Mr. GWIN.] I will, however, remark, in general terms, of what may be called the bulk of the bill as it came from the Executive, or according to Executive recommendation and demand, that it is not only not a deficiency in the sense in which I insist every one should be, but is directly and offensively the reverse. Not only has it resulted without authority of law, constructive or contingent, but it has been perpetrated—ay, sir, *perpetrated*, in direct violation and contempt of the law—in contempt of the well-considered action of the two Houses of Congress. By no one can this be denied; for nothing is better known—nothing

is more plainly and indelibly written upon the records of the last Congress than the proof of the allegation I have made. I “nothing extenuate nor set down aught in malice.” But it is set down, upon the records to which I refer, in characters so strong, and in terms so clear, that “he who runs may read,” and understand, too, that when certain sums of money, for the anticipated expenses of the War Department, were asked for by the Executive, they were, after full discussion and due deliberation, *refused* by the Congress. Those appropriations were urged by the Administration, but they were rejected by the Congress. Thus was the Executive told, in as plain and as strong language as could be uttered by an American Congress, that he should not have the money he asked for, nor expend it in the way he proposed. And yet, in the very face of that refusal—perhaps before the ink was dry with which it was written down—the Executive ordered, or authorized, or permitted, I care not which, the expenditure of these very sums of money, and, I think, in some instances still larger sums; and that, too, after a fashion of wasteful extravagance without a parallel in the administrative history of the Government, and absolutely astounding to contemplate. This, I repeat, has been done, not only without authority of law, but in direct violation and contempt of the law made and provided in special reference to this very class of expenditures, and for the very purpose of arresting their wasteful extravagance.

It is no answer to this to say that Congress was wrong in refusing this money, and that it was necessary for the public service that it should be expended. That is begging the whole question. In the first place, I do not believe, for we have no proof, that such expenditures were either proper or necessary. But, for the argument, admit the fact to be so, it goes no further than to palliate, in some degree, the guilt of the Executive. It can never relieve him entirely from the glaring culpability, in the eye of the law, of usurping powers which were never conferred upon him—of taking money from the public Treasury without lawful authority, and of setting a precedent of administrative licentiousness which, if followed out, can result only in breaking down those partition walls which the Constitution has wisely erected between the several Departments of this Government, and concentrating all effective powers in the hands of an irresponsible Executive.

The President already has command of the Army and Navy; and, from recent indications—some of them shrouded in mystery, it is true—is well enough disposed to *employ*, and to *pay* them, too, without the consent, or even the knowledge of Congress. We have heard much of the dangers of “uniting the purse and the sword” in the same hand. Our political opponents tried hard to raise a panic through the country, in 1840, with the “raw head and bloody bones” of Martin Van Buren’s standing army of two hundred thousand militia. But the present instance presents a more serious aspect in that direction, and, if carried out to its logical results, would, in my opinion, end more certainly in the consummation of that much-dreaded union of the money with the military power, than any which any event in the history of this Government has ever threatened.

I am aware that it may seem, to some minds, rather fanciful to indulge any such apprehensions as this suggestion may indicate; and I confess



that, at the hands of the present very quiet, accidental *locum tenens* of the Executive mansion, I fear no great violence; for, in addition to the valuable fact that a few revolving moons will "put him out of harm's way," he has certainly proved himself to be a most consistent and successful practitioner upon that notable maxim, so sagely delivered by Bulwer's Rag Merchant to *Leetle Paul*: "Never undertake by bluster what may be done by insinuation." But, then, it may be well to bear in mind that of all the tribes of animal creation, the *feline* is, at the same time, the most quiet and the most dangerous. Cromwell, it will be remembered, was a preacher of the gospel; yet suddenly, one morning, sword in hand, he drove a British Parliament from their seats. Monsieur Rodin, the humblest and quietest of men, presided over the fearful engine of French Jesuitism. And Louis Napoleon, erewhile a common-place dabbler in literature, and filling no great space in the world's eye, at once, as if by the decree of fate, sprung into power, and, as the acknowledged master of half a million of armed myrmidons, abolished the French Chambers, and assumed unlimited authority. Nay, it is by no means an extravagant supposition that he has, already, consummated the loftiest purposes of his licentious ambition, and, some two weeks ago, by the sole virtue of his own imperious will—*sic volo, sic jubeo*—decreed the 10th day of May to be the double anniversary of imperial power, by proclaiming himself Emperor of France. The next steamer will, probably, inform us whether that is so or not.

But to return to the case in hand. It is not, I repeat, from the present Executive that I apprehend any usurpation of authority, absolutely or immediately dangerous in itself, nor any violent disruption of our system of government. I do not suspect him of any such bold or criminal intentions; nor has he now time to execute, even if he entertained them. But, sir, it is not by any single or overt act of violence, or presently oppressive act of usurpation, that the symmetry of our Government is to be mutilated, or its strength impaired. It is not by open assault that its strongholds are to be carried; but from the stealthy working of the *mine* its danger is to come. It is not by the "bluster" of the bold and daring usurper, that our people are to be frightened from the propriety and intelligence of their patriotism; but, they have most to fear from the "insinuation" of the cool and crafty politician, who would lull them into security with the blandness of his words, and the gentle suavity of his smile, while he steals away their rights. And if it be allowable on so serious a subject, I beg leave to tell an anecdote which, though of a very humble and homely kind, will somewhat aptly illustrate the view I am attempting to express. It relates to the catching of *crows*.

It is a familiar fact, that of all the feathered tribe, the *crow* is the most wary, and sagacious. He is noted for seeing everything within the practicable range of his vision, and is never taken by surprise. He seems to have an instinctive perception, as he certainly has a suspicion, of danger, in every animal and every object in which it may possibly exist. He calculates, by some faculty superior to any in man, with unerring certainty, the range of every kind of fire-arm used in the region of country which he frequents; and, as a consequence, in an open field, where it is possible for him to see his enemy, no one can approach him within that range. He is equally sagacious

in detecting, and successful in escaping, all manner of traps and snares, which may be set for his obnoxious head or feet. For these reasons, and from his rapacious appetite for grain, he is one of the most formidable enemies of the farmer. Hence the use and name of "scare-crow." In no part of the country, perhaps, has this interesting bird proved more annoying or formidable, than in my native county, some hundred and fifty miles south of this, in Virginia. His number there was legion. Among those who suffered most from his depredations upon the crops, was a farmer, remarkable for his shrewdness and thrift—if I remember aright, his name was Ezekiel Powell—who, having exhausted all the arts and contrivances which the wit of man had then invented, without relief, made a solemn vow, one bright spring day, over a beautiful field which lay despoiled before him, that he would never sleep until he had drawn from the magazine of old mother necessity, some new invention to "circumvent the crows." And he kept his vow; for that very night he conceived and executed a plan which did, indeed, for the first time, circumvent and catch the *crows*—not by ones, or by dozens, only, but by hundreds and by thousands. The principle of this invention was "insinuation," not "bluster." It was in this wise: In the course of the night, he erected, in different parts of his field, several open rail-pens, such as farmers usually feed their hogs in, and in those pens he scattered corn. Such things were not new to the crows—they had no precedent for danger in a hog-pen baited with corn, and, as it seemed, no instinct against it. So, they descended without fear into these pens, and ate freely of the bait. This they were permitted to do several days in succession; the bait being renewed every night. Then commenced the application of the principle. The next night, when the corn was deposited on the bottom of the pen, there was, also, laid a single rail upon the top, encroaching just a little upon the open space. The crows came, as usual, the next day, and, the encroachment being too slight to attract attention, they went in and ate the corn, and went out again without suspicion. This double operation of baiting and encroaching, regularly but gradually, one rail at a time—corn tempting the appetite, and caution lulling suspicion—until, in a few days, the top of the pen was covered over, leaving open only space enough to allow the crows, by lighting on the rails, to fold their wings and slip in. When they had eaten the corn, and spread their wings to fly away to their homes in the wood, behold!—the space was too narrow to let them out! They were caught; the crow's boasted sagacity had been circumvented, and his liberty was lost!

The application I intend for this anecdote is obvious. Its fitness each mind will judge for itself. To my own mind, it is striking and significant. The incident occurred when I was a boy. It impressed me strongly, even then, as illustrative of certain points in human character. And since I have had the honor of a seat on this floor, I have found it still more strikingly and significantly illustrative of the conduct of the practiced politician, especially when he gets into power. Since I have given some attention to political affairs, and observed the working of our system of government, I have been unable to shut out the reminiscence of Ezekiel Powell and the crows, whenever I have seen a wily politician at the head of affairs, stretching one hand of unlawful power into the national



granary for the corn to bait his pens, and with the other, stealthily, and under cover of the night, laying on, one by one, the rails of encroachment and aggression. I confess, sir, I have sometimes felt my heart misgive me, for the welfare of the country, when I have seen victim after victim seek the trap thus set for them, and devour the bait with an avidity equaled only by their seeming unconsciousness of the prison rails which gathered over them, gradually, but surely, as they fed. Indeed, sir, that reminiscence assumes a painful, a humiliating significance of illustration, when my reluctant eyes are forced to see into how small a compass certain creatures, in the forms of men, can contract themselves, and through what small holes they will crawl, that they may feed upon the grains of corn which the hand of stratagem has scattered, for their delusion, upon the bottom of those pens!

But, the main aspect of this illustration, for which I introduced it, is not the exercise of this unlawful power upon corrupt or corruptible materials. That, it is true, is painful and humiliating. It is, however, where it is brought to bear upon the honest and unsuspecting that the great danger obtains. The great body of American citizens are intelligent to understand, patriotic to cherish, vigilant to guard, and courageous to defend, their principles and their rights. But they are also generous and confiding. Assail them openly—let danger threaten them, even from afar, so it but wear the port of danger—and they stand by their arms, and are invincible. *Animis, opibusque parati!* Under the white flag of peace and amity, however, their worst enemy may approach, and be kindly entertained by them. The kiss of peace disarms them of suspicion, even, as too often happens, when it but serves to transfuse into their open hearts the deadliest poison; and the song of patriotism too easily wins their confidence, when it is but the syren lullaby of treachery and betrayal. Let the purpose of selfish ambition or personal aggrandizement, at the expense of the true principles of this Government, be avowed, or made manifest, and it is defeated as soon as known; and its author, be he President or legislator, civilian or soldier, is, in that hour, hurled over our political battlements, to fall far down among spirits of kindred impurity, and dwell with them in outer darkness forever. As I said before, the danger to our Government and people lies not in any direct assault or open violence. It comes along the stealthy mine and in the night attack, when the garrison is at rest and the sentinel slumbers at his post, or has become unfaithful to his trust. Sir, it is against this danger I would warn the people. And to the compass of my power I will do so, however feeble my voice, and however unheeded my warning may prove to be. And this mine—this covered way—this insidious and dangerous approach of the real enemies of the Government and the people, is through the National Treasury. The lawless hand that takes the money from the public purse is more dangerous, perhaps, than the corrupt one which uses it; but they act in concert, and to a common and fearful end—the latter being but the means to purchase absolution for the soul-corroding sin which the former had committed; while both sit down to a common feast and revel on the spoils their joint iniquities had procured.

And this brings me back to this particular deficiency bill. Such as I described it—its main bulk made up of the very sums, somewhat en-

larged, which the Congress positively refused to grant—such it is, as it came from the hands of the Executive. Now, sir, I repeat, I care not whether Congress acted wisely or unwisely, or whether these expenditures were proper, or necessary, or not, (and I do not believe, because I have no proof, that they were either necessary or proper,) there is no denying the fact, and no escaping from its consequences, that the Executive did go on to make, and even to increase, these expenditures, not only without authority of law, but in direct, and I might say contumacious, violation and contempt of the law. That is the fact, sir. And that is the point I make. It is wholly useless and unsatisfactory to me, as it is to the principles of our Government, to say the *motives* of the Executive were good, and he *intended* it all for the public interest. I mean no personal disrespect or disparagement to the gentleman who fills the presidential chair at this time; but I speak of his public acts, as a public officer under the law, and not above the law, when I say that any man in this community who was arraigned at the bar of public justice upon a charge of taking money from another's pocket without authority of law, and against the owner's consent, might, with equal legal right, and with the same efficacy for acquittal, plead the justification of *good motives*, and the *intention* to promote the interest of the owner. The law makes every man, of sane mind, the keeper of his own money, and secures to him the right to dispense it at his own will; and very properly punishes, as a misdemeanor, or felony, the infringement of that right. So the Constitution, for the same general reason—surely for none less wise or important—makes Congress, as the representative of the people, the keeper of the people's money; and not only guaranties this as a right in Congress, but imposes it as a duty, that Congress, and Congress alone, shall dispense it. And for any infringement of this right, or obstruction of this duty, the law provides condign punishment. But I may be told that no such law does, or can, relate to the Chief Executive, as he is not a disbursing officer. This, sir, is true—literally true. And yet we all know that, in fact, it is one of those “fictions of the law”—such as “the King can do no wrong,” which have often been as subversive of the ends of justice, as they are discreditable to legal science, and repugnant to common sense.

Sir, the honorable Senator from Mississippi, [Mr. ADAMS,] who sits on my left, was manifestly conscious of this a few weeks ago, when he offered his penal amendment to the bill making appropriation for extending the Capitol. I think he was right; and I hope he will not abandon his attempt to incorporate it in some one of our laws. This very bill, which is sure of passing, is an appropriate one for the purpose. It cannot remedy the past; but, infused in this, for the future, it will serve, in some degree, to mitigate the bitterness of the black draught now preparing for us to swallow.

In saying so much about the Executive, I apprehend I have said nothing which the Constitution itself does not suggest, and warrant me in saying. I find in that instrument, in prescribing the duties of the President, it provides that “he shall take care that the *laws be faithfully executed*.” What laws? Why, *all* the laws, and none more certainly than those relating to the expenditure of the public money. By *whom* executed? Why, by no one more certainly, or more faithfully, than



by himself; for if he, the highest officer known to the law, be unfaithful to it, how shall he exact fidelity of others? And to the performance of this duty he is bound by the solemn sanctions of an oath. But here was a law of Congress, signed and approved by himself, and in special response to his request for certain sums of money for expenditure, which *refused* that request, and said to him in the most deliberate and emphatic manner, "thus far shalt thou go, and no further." And yet, in full view of this provision of the Constitution—fresh from the Holy Evangelist upon which he had sworn this oath—in the very face of this refusal of Congress—and in defiance of this prohibition to expend the public money, he did go further, and did expend this very money, which had been refused to him, and which he had been forbid to expend!

I shall not undertake to characterize this high-handed act of Executive power. I have given the facts in connection with it, and facts they are. Let them have such significance as they may be entitled to, and such significance as I am sure they will have with the people of this country, when spread before them, as they shall be.

I do not know, Mr. President, that I should have dwelt so much upon these particular facts, important as I consider them, but for another fact, of some significance, which has occupied no little share of the public attention—which, indeed, has been forced upon public attention, with an earnestness and pertinacity from which there has been no escape, for some twelve months past, or more. I allude to the fact, that this Administration, and especially its distinguished chief, has been eulogized all over the land, and lauded to the very skies, (as every man will be who has a hundred thousand offices in his gift, and millions of patronage to give with them, by certain persons and presses,) as the very exemplar of a law-abiding and a law-enforcing Executive!

I might claim the right of argument, and ask of those who affirm so much of the Administration, or its head, to point me to the instance in which it has abided any law which it could have avoided abiding, or in which it aided in enforcing one which, otherwise, would have been disregarded or violated. But, I should ask in vain; for the instance does not exist in either case. I know very well what some of the special friends of the Executive might say, and what some of them have said; but they are shadows, sir—"shadows all," and vanish away like other unsubstantial visions, when brought to the test of examination. We have just seen how the law has been observed in expending the public money. I might have something to say upon the boasted achievements in other branches of the law-enforcing power, if such subjects were relevant to the bill under consideration. I shall reserve what I might say, until those subjects are fairly before the Senate.

It must not be objected to my allegation that the Executive has acted in defiance of the prohibition of Congress, that no such positive prohibition, as I have assumed, was made in terms. That prohibition was made in the only way in which Congress could make it—by refusing to grant the supplies—the way provided in the Constitution, and evidently intended, and always understood to be effective and controlling. Indeed, if this be not so, then there is no way in which the action of Congress can operate as a check upon the Executive, unless by the *ultima ratio*—impeachment.

All that careful and well-adjusted arrangement of the Constitution, whereby no money shall be expended without an appropriation by Congress, is worse than nonsense; it is a mockery of constitutional government—a delusion, and a lie—the Executive above the law, and wholly irresponsible, and the public Treasury at the mercy of his arbitrary, single, and sovereign will! Sir, why does the Executive send estimates here to us, at all, and why do we go through the solemn farce of making appropriations at all? If, without our authority, and even in defiance of our prohibition, he can incur expenses for this Government and expend the public money by millions, as he has done, then we have in operation here a very unnecessarily complex and expensive establishment, which might well be dispensed with; and my honorable friend from Virginia, [Mr. HUNTER,] who has latterly been winning so much reputation as our Chancellor of the Exchequer, may "hang up his bruised arms for monuments," and exclaim with the valourous Moor, "Othello's occupation's gone!" If the Executive may disregard or violate the laws in one case, he may in another, and in all; and if our duty here is to consist in merely registering his decrees, *after he has made them*, I think we had as well give up that rather poor formality, and let him register as well as decree. I apprehend he is as competent to the one duty as to the other; while we shall really be needed for neither. And still further, if he may, without law, and in defiance of law, expend \$3,000,000, he may with equal propriety expend \$10,000,000, or even the whole \$50,000,000, to raise which the people are oppressed with taxation, and then to expend which they are to be corrupted with Executive patronage!

But, Mr. President, I will drop the Executive for the time, and leave this special view of the question, for a glance at its more general aspect. It is a most important, if not fearful, consideration, and none the less so from having grown somewhat familiar, that the *actual expenditures* (not, in my opinion, the *necessary expenses*) of our Federal Government have been rapidly increasing for several years, and have now attained a magnitude which, to one who regards the interest of those who have to pay these expenditures, and looks to the causes which alone can give stability to the Government itself, is positively enormous and appalling. When I think of it, and reflect upon the past, I am filled with wonder at the change of temper of the people, under taxation. As we know, in 1828, for expending some \$13,000,000 a year, an Administration was deemed licentious, and driven from power. In 1840, twelve years later, another Administration, for expending some \$26,000,000 fairly chargeable to it, shared the same fate. And now at another period of twelve years, in a time of profound peace, we have an Executive that coolly expends about \$52,000,000, a part of it without law, and against law; and upon the back of the bill writes itself down as the exemplar of Republican propriety, simplicity, and economy, in the administration of a constitutional government of laws. What do the people say?—what will they do? Sir, the period has come, the measure alike of time and of money is full. If for \$13,000,000 in 1828, and \$26,000,000 in 1840, the respective administrations of John Quincy Adams and Martin Van Buren were rebuked and repudiated, what shall be the meed of this Administration, which, with so rapid a pace of



progress in the rate of expenditure, has attained to \$52,000,000, in 1852? That is a practical question, to which the people are now preparing to give an answer. I submit it to them; undertaking, however, to furnish a few facts which may help them to work out the problem, in a manner consistent with their true interests, and the safety of the Government which has been established for their benefit and protection.

The precise amount of the expenditures for the present year I do not know; the returns before us do not yet disclose. It has been stated—and if we may assume an amount corresponding with the increase which has been going on, the statement is substantially correct—that they will amount to at least \$52,000,000.

Then we have this fact—and I confess it startled me when I first discovered it—that the ratio of increase in the expenditures of this Government has been one hundred per cent. for every twelve years. Thus, we had, in 1828, an expenditure of \$13,000,000. For that, the American people hurled the administration of the younger Adams from power. Coming down to 1840, at the end of twelve years, we find the administration of Martin Van Buren expending \$26,000,000. For that it was repudiated. Coming down twelve years later, to this time, we find this Administration doubling that amount, and expending \$52,000,000! At the same rate, in 1864, we should have the sum of \$104,000,000; and in 1876—just a century from our birth as a nation—a tax list of \$208,000,000! Think of that, Mr. President! Now, sir, is this to continue? I ask the Congress, and, through them, the people, shall this state of things continue?

The magnitude of this evil must arrest the attention of every mind. Has it a remedy? And, if so, what is that remedy, and when and how shall it be applied? These are questions which every mind, looking to the interest of the tax-paying people on the one hand, and to the principles of this Government—upon which alone it can be perpetuated—on the other, must promptly, and seriously, and anxiously consider, and answer promptly and definitively. It is not my purpose to undertake either at this time. I may do so hereafter. In the mean time, I throw them out to others. Along with them, as peculiarly appropriate for joint consideration, I will submit a few facts, which astonished me when they first came to my knowledge, and which make a strong appeal, indeed, for reform, and a reduction of our expenditures.

It is certainly the theory of our Government that the citizen shall be left as free and uncontrolled by legal enactments, as the safety and protection of the community will permit; and that no more money shall be levied on labor and property, in the form of taxes, than may be absolutely necessary to pay the proper expenses of the Government, under a plain, republican, economical administration. And, in accordance with this theory, it has been our boast, as it ought certainly to be our constant endeavor, to simplify the machinery, and lighten the burdens of the Government, which, as one of the unavoidable conditions of human imperfection, our people are, for their own protection, compelled to bear. It was an aphorism in the minds of the wise founders of our Government, that “the world is governed too much.” It is no less true in our day; and I hold it to be our duty to recognize the principles on which it is

founded, and to follow out, in practice, the policy it enjoins. That principle is, as I understand it, that Government should protect, rather than control; and the policy that results, in a financial view at least, is to collect the *minimum* of revenue that may be compatible with the *maximum* of good to the governed; and that *maximum*, again, I insist, is found, when the people are least burdened with the machinery of Government, and have the fewest and smallest dealings with the tax-gatherer.

I know, sir, there are those, and they are learned and able men, under the exhausted receiver of whose logic I could hardly live a minute, who are in favor of a strong and splendid Government, yet, I beg leave to differ with them in opinion. And yet, I too, am the advocate of a strong and splendid Government. But, sir, the strength and the splendor of Government which I advocate are materially different from theirs—reside in a different quarter, and consist of different elements. *They* go for a great Federal head at the center, and a concentration of all power here; and, along with that, a magnificent and complex system of government machinery; and, as a means of supporting, perpetuating, and still further strengthening and adding splendor to that power, they need, and would have, an immense revenue—ay, sir, the very *maximum* which the industry and property of the people would bear. On the contrary, sir, in accordance with the principle and policy I have indicated, I desire the strength of the Government to be in the hearts of the people—where it will be, and be impregnable, if their affections be invited by protection, and not their labor controlled by Government. And the splendor I desire for the Government should consist, as its only true splendor ever has consisted, and only can consist, in the untrammelled enterprise, and prosperous industry of a free people—free in their thoughts, free in their pursuits, with the ability and the will, which they have ever proved, and ever will prove, to a government they love, because it does not oppress, but protects them, to give “millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.” This marks the difference between us. *They* want a strong Government; *I* want a strong people. *They* want a splendid Government, *I* want a prosperous and happy people. *They* want, for this strong and splendid Government, as much money as, by the power of government machinery, can be dragged from the pockets of the people; *I* want no more from the people than they can easily and cheerfully pay—no more for the Government than may be necessary for its simple and effective existence, under a close and economical administration of its constitutional laws, and legitimate functions.

The facts to which I alluded, and to which I would call attention, are found in the administrative policy of the British Government. That Government, like all other Governments, made for and not by the people, who have to bear its burdens and pay its expenses, has been supposed to practice upon the doctrine of a strong and splendid Government, of which I have spoken, collecting as much money as the people could pay, and expending it for the purposes of its own strength and splendor. And, doubtless, this has been its policy until very recently. But latterly, it seems, a change has come over it; and, instead of an annual and steady increase, alike of revenue and expenditure, as formerly, it is found that a reduction in both has been effected.

The authority upon which I rely for this state-



ment is not, it is true, official, but it is, I apprehend, entitled to credit. I find it in the National Intelligencer of March 27th, in the letter of the London correspondent of that paper. It is in review of a pamphlet, deemed of good authority in England, on "The Finances and Trade of the United Kingdom at the beginning of the year 1852." It is there found that, beginning with 1846, both the income and expenditures of the British Government have diminished, down to the close of the last year. I will read from the letter, that all the material facts it presents, upon these points, may be seen in connection:

"LONDON, March 11, 1852.

"We have before us a very interesting pamphlet on 'The Finances and Trade of the United Kingdom, at the beginning of the year 1852,' which exhibits the information promised in the title page in a very clear and concise manner. The work is anonymous, but is attributed to a gentleman whose name would add authority to the statements, did they need it. They are, however, corroborated by every possible coincident circumstance, and partake 'so largely,' as the Times very forcibly observed, 'of abstract demonstration, that they might almost have been expressed by figures alone.' We will strive to give a summary of this important and instructive publication. And first as to the national income:

In 1846 the national ordinary income was... £52,950,202  
In 1851 it was only..... 51,669,553

"But whilst the former and larger amount was nearly £2,000,000 below the expenditure of the year, the latter and smaller sum was £2,726,396 above the expenditure of 1851. But this does not exhibit the whole of the case. During the interval taxes yielding the annual average amount of £5,500,000 (in round numbers) had been repealed, and these were principally upon articles of everyday consumption, such as sugar, coffee, butter, cheese, bricks, timber, &c. So that, had the same taxes been levied in 1851 as were in 1846, the revenue of the former year would have exceeded the expenditure by more than £8,000,000 sterling.

"The Economist, in taking a survey of the Russell Administration, and the effects of its policy and proceedings, has the following table. It will be observed that the amount which the Economist gives as the revenue of 1851 exceeds that stated in the pamphlet which we have quoted by more than half a million sterling. The difference arises from the Economist including £563,453 of extraordinary revenue which the pamphlet does not. The Economist states as follows:

	Income.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficiency.
1847	£51,546,264	£54,202,948.....		£2,956,684
1848	53,388,717	54,185,136 .....		796,419
1849	52,951,749	50,853,628	£2,098,126	
1850	52,810,680	50,231,874	2,578,806	
1851	52,233,004	49,438,496	2,726,396	

The expenditure upon the Army, Navy, and Ordnance services was—

In 1846..... £18,502,147  
In 1851 ..... 14,573,856

Reduction..... 3,928,291

I would call the attention of Senators to this very remarkable fact, in view of the excuse I anticipate our Administration and its friends will assume for the increased and increasing expenditures for our Army and Navy. Here is Great Britain, with her army not reduced, but increasing every year; with her military operations extending, and requiring, it would seem, a greater expenditure of money; her naval establishment certainly not reduced, but increased, at least, by the addition of many steamships; still maintaining her rank and position as a military and maritime Power; and yet, by a wise and economical reduction of expenditure, for three named branches—navy, army, and ordnance—in three years, to the extent of £3,928,291, or nearly \$20,000,000! We, on the contrary, without materially increasing our Army—indeed, greatly reducing it since 1848—without increasing our Navy, and in a time of

profound peace, are going on, from year to year, increasing our expenditures for these branches, almost in the ratio of geometrical progression!

The letter goes on:

"But to return to our pamphlet. Let us descend from generals to particulars, and look at some of the details upon which these broad statements are established. How have the comforts of the people at large, the condition of the masses of society, been affected by these results? The Times says sugar is now one of the first necessities in English life. Nine years ago the entire consumption of this article in the United Kingdom was 4,068,331 cwt. Last year it was 6,884,189 cwt.; showing an increase of sixty-nine per cent. Now, it has been computed, by careful investigation, that to about one fourth of the actual consumers of sugar, the variation in price would be no object; that is to say, that to one purchaser out of four, it signifies little whether sugar is 6d. a pound, or a shilling. The remaining three fourths, therefore, represent the class which is benefited by reductions, and the increase of consumption above specified, shows that each individual of this class was able to buy and use twenty-three pounds of sugar in 1851, instead of nine pounds, which was all he could afford in 1842. Similarly, there were consumed in 1851, 53,965,112 pounds of tea, in place of 37,355,911 pounds in 1842; 28,062,978 pounds of tobacco, in place of 22,013,146 pounds; and 32,564,164 pounds of coffee, in place of 23,519,646 pounds."

We here find, Mr. President, not only the general facts I stated, which, I confess, were to my mind astonishing; but we find also what seems to follow very naturally, and is highly gratifying to one entertaining my views, that the comforts and conveniences of life to the people have increased, if not, perhaps, in the precise ratio, yet certainly in connection with, and doubtless as a consequence of, their relief from the burdens of taxation. Indeed, I think it will be found by a fair examination, that this increase of benefits to the people has exceeded the ratio of their relief from taxation, as exhibited in this statement. And this is not at all to be wondered at. It may fairly be assumed as the result of the encouraged hope, the aroused energies, and the stimulated industry of a people, by the prospect thus presented to them, that their rights and their interests, as entities to be respected and cared for, have been at last recognized; and that in future some portion of the profits of their toil is to be enjoyed by themselves, and may descend to their children, and not all go, as formerly, to build up a strong and splendid government, as a thing apart from and above the people.

These facts—these reductions in the income and expenditures of the British Government—may be small in the amounts of money they express; but, to my mind, they are among the most important, and significant, and valuable of all the signs of the times, which now appear, or have for years appeared, above the political horizon of the world. *Magna Charta* was doubtless a great achievement for the bold Barons of England; and has, with as little doubt, done much for liberal government there, and even with us. So the repeal of the Corn Laws was the valuable triumph of a principle. But this reduction of taxes, and of government expenditures, without a revolution and without violence, but by the silent operations of a sound principle, and indicating, as it does, the extended sphere in which that principle is recognized and potential, is, to my mind, I repeat, more important, more significant, and more valuable, for popular rights and good government, than either *magna charta*, or the repeal of the corn laws, or, indeed, of any reform which England has ever known.

In this aspect, Mr. President, I rejoice at it; and, as a philanthropist, I hail it as the only real harbinger I have seen from the other side of the Atlantic, of the practical recognition of popular



rights and interests, as predicates of the powers of government. In this aspect it is, indeed, important, significant, and valuable, to the whole family of civilized man.

I said, also, that this reform in England made a strong appeal to us, as American legislators, for reform in our own affairs. Not for a change in our form or system of government; but in its *administration*. For, how does it compare—or rather how does it *contrast*—with what we have done, and are now doing? I confess not only to astonishment, but alarm at that contrast; especially am I alarmed at it in view of the difference in principle, and in what I had cherished the belief was the difference in policy, between our Government and that of Great Britain. That difference, as I undertook to delineate, consisted in a Government as made *by* the people, and administered for their sole use and benefit, at the *minimum* of expense and weight to those who bear it for protection; in contradistinction to a Government as made *for* the people, and administered for the use and benefit of the Government itself, at the *maximum* of expense and weight to those who bear it for control, and not for protection.

But, sir, however strongly this difference in *principle* may preponderate in *our* favor, that of the *policy* is in the *other* scale. What I have already stated shows this to be so. That is, while Great Britain has commenced and is actually carrying out the policy of lowering her taxes, reducing her revenues, and curtailing her expenditures, and that, too, with palpable and striking benefits to her people, we—ay, sir, *we*—in alarm, but of a truth, I say it,—*we* are increasing our taxes, augmenting our revenues, and enlarging our expenditures! Enlarging, did I say? nay, sir, *doubling* our expenditures every twelve years! And wherefore, and with what effect? Am I told that the increase in the extent of our country, within the periods for which I have estimated, has made this increase of expenditure necessary, or that it is required by the increase of our population? Such an answer is neither satisfactory, nor in accordance with the facts. I admit that the increase in the extent of our territory and of our population, and the incidents of that increase, have called for increased expenditure. But, the increase in the latter case is not in due proportion—indeed is in enormous excess over that in the former. I admit that the \$13,000,000 of 1828, or even the \$26,000,000 of 1840, would be insufficient for our necessities of this year. And it is not at the mere *fact* of an increase that I am alarmed, or of which I complain. I admit the necessity of an increase. If we will acquire and multiply, we must pay. But, sir, it is the *ratio* and proportion of the increase of expenditure, above and beyond the necessary wants of our condition, with all our increase of territory and numbers, at which I am alarmed, and of which I do complain. And that there is good ground for such alarm and such complaint I think the facts will show. What are those facts?

No one will deny—indeed, all must admit—that an increase in the extent of our possessions, and in the number of our population, brings with it the necessity of some increase of our expenditures. But I apprehend that no one will—certainly no one can fairly—claim that such expenditures shall increase even *pari passu*, or, in the same *ratio*, with our territory and population. To do so would be to contradict the dictates of common sense, and the common observation and experi-

ence in all the other business of life. To say that they shall *exceed* them, is, to my mind, a monstrous absurdity.

But, I repeat, what are the facts, in this connection, as disclosed in the history and progress of our Government?

The details through which we must look to ascertain what these facts really are, and what they mean, are dry and distasteful to most minds; and to my own they are by no means inviting. But when ascertained, as lights thrown upon the character and tendency of our Government, as it has been, and is now administered, is great enough to overcome my natural repugnance to their examination, and more than repay the labor of searching after them.

I will not inflict upon the Senate all of these details; but you must bear with me while I present some of the leading facts which they develop.

To give a fair view of this whole field of inquiry, I begin with the Administration of General Washington, in 1789.

And, first of our territorial extent, or possessions:

At that time there were *thirteen States*, (“The original Thirteen,” viz: Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island,) which, with the territory belonging to or ceded by some of them to the common Union, embraced an area of... 780,283 sq. miles.

Since then we have increased that area as follows, viz: in 1803, by purchase, from France, of Louisiana, including Oregon, &c., 558,386 square miles; in 1819, from Spain, of Florida, 59,268 square miles; in 1845, by annexation of Texas, 325,520 square miles; and in 1848, by conquest and purchase from Mexico, of California, &c., 526,070 square miles; making an aggregate of increase of area of.....1,469,252 “

Total area at this time....2,249,535 “

Showing an increase of a fraction over *three per cent.* per annum; or an aggregate increase of about *one hundred and ninety per cent.*, (or threefold,) from 1790 to 1850.

Secondly, of our population:

According to the several census returns, it has been as follows:

In 1790.....	3,929,827
1800.....	5,305,941
1810.....	7,239,814
1820.....	9,638,191
1830.....	12,866,020
1840.....	17,069,453
1850.....	23,257,723

Showing an increase of a fraction over *nine per cent.* per annum; or aggregate increase of about *five hundred and seventy per cent.* (a fraction less than sixfold) from 1790 to 1850.

Thirdly, of the revenue, or receipts, of the Government from all sources:

The following table, [see table A, Appendix, page 16,] compiled from official documents, shows



those receipts, under the head of the respective sources from which they were derived. It will be observed that this table does not give the receipts, in detail for every year—the amount stated being the annual average of each Administration ascertained by dividing the aggregate of all the years of the Administration, by the number of years of its continuance.

From this it is seen, that in WASHINGTON's time our average annual receipts were \$6,609,081 35; whereas now, under Mr. Fillmore, they are \$53,132,608 42!—showing an increase of nearly *thirteen per cent.* per annum, or an aggregate increase of a fraction *over eight hundred per cent.*, (or eightfold,) from 1789 to 1851! This estimate shows the gross amount of taxes paid annually by the people of the United States for the support of the Government. Compare this with the exhibit I have just made, of the increase of our population, and it will be found that the *ratio of increase* of our taxes, (*that is, the burdens upon labor and property,*) for the support of Government, has *exceeded* the ratio of increase of population about *thirty-four per cent.*—or *more than one third*. Thus, in 1790, with a population of 3,929,827, our average receipts were \$6,609,081 35 per annum; being a fraction less than an average of *one dollar and seventy cents* (\$1 70) apiece collected from each individual. While now, in 1851, with a population of 23,257,723, our average receipts are \$53,132,608 42 per annum—being a fraction more than *two dollars and twenty-five cents* (\$2 25) apiece collected from each individual.

In view of these facts, and tested by the plainest principles of political economy, the practice of our Government, in its system of *taxation*, has been unwise, and its tendency is alike injurious to the interest of the people and dangerous to its own existence. And this, for reasons which are obvious to every intelligent mind, and to which I shall recur more particularly hereafter.

But if, in the matter of *receipts*, as compared with population, we find cause of objection and complaint, from a similar comparison of *expenditures* that cause will derive more than *threefold* force, and become absolutely alarming.

Fourthly. The course and amount of *Expenditures* are exhibited in the following table, [see table B, page 16,] also compiled from official documents. Like the table of *receipts*, it condenses the details of each year into the average of each Administration, by dividing the aggregate of each by the length of its term.

From this it is seen, that in WASHINGTON's time, our average annual expenditures, exclusive of the amount of public debt paid off, were \$1,986,337 92; whereas now, (in 1851,) under Mr. Fillmore, they amount to \$40,177,030 00!—showing an increase of about *thirty-one per cent.* per annum; or an aggregate increase of a fraction *over twenty hundred per cent.*, (or more than *twentyfold*,) from 1789 to 1851!

Institute here the comparisons I suggested, and we find that, while our territory has increased less than two hundred per cent., (or threefold,) our *population* less than *six hundred per cent.*, (or sixfold,) and our *receipts*, large as they have been, a fraction more than *eight hundred per cent.*, (or eightfold,) our *expenditures* have exceeded *twenty hundred per cent.*, (or twentyfold.)

It does seem enormous, as I have shown, that not only the actual increase of *taxes*, is more than *four times* greater than that of *territory*, and more

than *one third* greater than that of *population*, and in this latter relation increasing the rate which each individual has to pay, from *one dollar and seventy-cents* (\$1 70) to *two dollars and twenty-five cents* (\$2 25.) But, here, in the matter of *expenditures*, we find the increase far greater in the general proportion, and further so still, *pro rata*, for each individual. Thus in Washington's time, with a *population* of 3,929,827, the *expenditure* for administering the Government, was only \$1,986,337, or at about *fifty cents* cost to each individual; whereas, now, under Mr. Fillmore, with a *population* of 23,257,723, the *expenditures* amount to \$40,177,030, or at the cost of about one dollar and seventy cents (\$1 70) to each individual, being an increase of *three hundred and forty per cent.* in the *rate of expenditure* from 1790 to 1851.

It will be observed here, that while the increase of expenditures is now enormously out of proportion, whether compared with that of territory, population, or receipts, still the actual receipts are now, as in 1790, much greater than the actual expenditures. An examination of the tables A and B, already referred to, in the Appendix, will explain this, without lessening the force of my charge, that these expenditures are excessive to a degree which must alarm every one who deems economy necessary or desirable in the Government. It will there be found that, while I have given in my remarks, as *expenditures*, only the amounts expended in the *current annual administration*, there are large sums besides which are applied in part to the payment of interest and principal of the *national debt*. This debt is incurred in the form of public loans, and by the issue of Treasury notes, to some amount in every Administration—except General Jackson's, and only \$25,606 22 in Mr. Jefferson's; and the amounts received from it go to swell the receipts. During the last three Administrations, receipts from this source have been considerable, and not far from equal. Thus, in Harrison and Tyler's term, its annual average was \$10,724,327 54; in Polk's, it was \$11,733,974 81; and in Taylor and Fillmore's it has been \$10,878,233 00.

I have thus excluded the amount paid on the public debt as part of the expenditure, to avoid the even seeming injustice of charging one Administration with an expenditure which was a liability incurred by another. I could not do so from any purpose to injure the present Administration, as a political opponent; for, it will be seen by the table (B) that, taking the total of expenditures, including the amount paid on the public debt, respectively, by Mr. Polk's and the present Administration, the disparity between them, and *against Mr. Fillmore*, is greater than by excluding that amount, as to both. Thus, the expenditures, *exclusive* of public debt, are, for the annual average of Polk's administration, \$36,708,601 39, and for Fillmore's \$40,177,030 00; difference *against Fillmore*, \$3,468,428 61. This is bad enough, considering that Polk's administration was engaged in a most expensive foreign war, and Fillmore's has had no war. But, if I added the public debt, in each case, it would stand for Polk, \$43,897,916 51, and for Fillmore, \$55,442,481; making a difference *against Fillmore* of \$11,544,564 49. And lest any one shall complain that I make this difference too great, by charging (as will be seen in note, in table B) to Fillmore, the amount paid to Mexico, under the treaty of 1848, which has averaged three annual payments of \$5,896,000 00



each, I deduct that now; and yet the balance of difference *against Fillmore*, is \$5,648,564,49. Thus, it is seen that, upon the most liberal estimate, the friends of this Administration can ask, General Taylor and *Mr. Fillmore* have expended \$5,896,000 more per annum, in administering this Government, in a time of profound "peace with all the world and the rest of mankind," than *James K. Polk* required to conduct it through a three years' expensive foreign war, which he closed with the addition to our domain of five hundred and twenty-six thousand and seventy square miles of territory! Let this be borne in mind, as a great political fact, which cannot be controverted, which illustrates the age in which it has occurred, and which marks the difference between a *Democratic* and *Whig* Administration of this Government!

In view of the foregoing, I appeal to the Senate and the country, if I expressed any apprehension not warranted by the facts, when I said the extravagance of the Government, in the rapid increase of its moneyed expenditures, was alarming to every man who deems economy in its administration at all important, or its existence worth preserving? Passing over the intermediate periods, as immaterial for consideration at this point, we find that, within a period of sixty years, from the day of *WASHINGTON* to the present time, while our territory has increased *less than threefold*, and our population *less than sixfold*; yet our taxes have increased *eightfold*, and our expenditures more than *twentyfold*!—that is, as \$1,986,337 is to \$40,177,030. I speak now of last year—1851. The expenditures of this year I do not know—the official records of them are not before us. The estimate, however, is some \$12,000,000 more than last year; and that would make it \$52,000,000, at least, which the past warrants me in saying is not, probably, greater than we shall, in due time, find the real sum to be. Extend the same ratio of increase into the future, and how long will the tax-payers be able to pay the demands of the Government, or how will the Government itself be able to bear such a burden as \$104,000,000, in 1864, or \$208,000,000 in 1876, &c.? Even those who suggest the increase of territory and population, as an excuse for increased expenditures, find the argument does not sustain them. The excess is too great. It falls by its own weight; and, along with it, fall the explanation and excuse.

And yet, we are told that the Government is now blessed with an economical, republican, and faithful Administration!

Mr. President, it is not my duty, or my purpose, to point out how the President should act, or what he should do. I do know, however, what he ought not to do; that the sanctions of his official oath forbid him to do otherwise than execute the laws which Congress passes, and to withhold his hand from doing what Congress had a right to forbid, and did forbid him to do. And I assert that he has not only not executed the law on this subject, as passed by the last Congress, but he has usurped authority in the very face of a positive Congressional prohibition. Whether that act be right or wrong in itself, in regard to the public interests, is another question altogether, which I am not now discussing. But I submit to the Senate and to the country, that if, because the President, at any time, may think Congress has not acted wisely, he may assume to himself the power of using the public money at his discretion, then the Constitution is a dead letter, and we are sitting here in mockery

of its provisions, and to no useful, or even respectable purpose. In that case, we are playing a part here, and calling it legislation, which is in itself a miserable farce, and most expensive to the people. The Constitution makes *us* the guardians of the public Treasury, when it declares that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The *Executive* has no authority to use the public money, until *after* Congress shall have appropriated it. To all that he is bound by an oath. Yet we are told by him, in the terms of this very bill, that he has used about *three millions* of this money, which *was not appropriated*—nay, worse than that, which although urgently demanded by him, Congress positively and emphatically refused to appropriate! *That is the point.* Whether Congress was right or wrong—whether we acted wisely or unwisely in making that refusal, and imposing that prohibition upon the Executive, (which we had the unquestionable constitutional power to do,) is another question, not now in controversy. I expressly excluded that in the beginning. Should it ever come up, I may have something to say upon it. For the present, I insist upon the single point I have here presented. Is it right, or can it ever be right for the President, when no public exigency makes it indispensable, to use the public money, or incur pecuniary liabilities for the Government, without an appropriation, as the Constitution prescribes? Above all, can any Executive act be more culpable in itself, or more dangerous in its tendency, than to expend the public money, or create a public debt, in the face of a positive and deliberate and emphatic refusal of Congress? I answer, NO! And I desire that my answer shall go to the people, that they may decide whether it be the true and proper answer or not.

I have assumed that, in theory and by analogy with other pursuits in the business of life, the necessary *expenses* of administering our Government do not, and that our *expenditures* should not, keep pace, in their annual increase, with that of territory or population. A few facts from the record will show in practice not only that an increase of territory does not necessarily cause an increase of expenditure, but that a very large acquisition of territory is compatible with, and has been actually accompanied by, a *reduction* instead of an increase of expenditure. Thus, as we have seen from the administrative history of the Government to which I have referred, while the average annual expenditures of *General Washington* were only \$1,986,337, *John Adams*, his immediate successor, increased them to \$5,337,087; and *Mr. Jefferson*, who came next, reduced them to \$5,137,598, making a *reduction* of some \$200,000 per annum upon Mr. Adams's expenditures. And yet, as I have already shown, in the early part of his administration, *Mr. Jefferson*, by the treaty with France of the 30th April, 1803, acquired the vast territory then known as Louisiana, including Oregon, and containing five hundred and fifty-eight thousand three hundred and eighty-six square miles! This was done by purchase, for the sum of \$11,250,000; the principal of which, although not payable for fifteen years, yet bearing interest at six per cent. per annum, payable half-yearly, and amounting to \$337,500 per annum. Thus, while acquiring this immense territory—more than two thirds as large as all our former possessions, and incurring, as a necessary *expense*, an actual increase of \$337,500 per annum, he *reduced* the actual *expenditures* some \$200,000.



These two items together, running through his long administration of eight years, show that, while his administration conferred advantages upon the country which were incalculable in value, and unexampled before or since in good results, it did so at a diminution, comparatively, of \$537,500, and absolutely of \$200,000 per annum of *pecuniary expenditure*! During this long period of eight years, it must be borne in mind, also, our population was rapidly increasing; and the best capabilities and energies of our whole system of Government were never more boldly or happily developed. And yet the whole of *Jefferson's* administration, with territory and population both nearly doubled, not only averaged \$200,000 less, per annum, than that of its predecessor of only *four* years, but its last year cost actually \$1,000,000 less than the last year of *Adams*! In view of this single instance alone, where *increase* of territory and population were accompanied by actual *diminution of expenditure*, what becomes of the pretext upon which the advocates and apologists of our present extravagance attempt to justify it?

But this instance, though, perhaps, the most striking, is not the only one in our history which sustains, by its recorded facts, the position I have assumed.

Our second acquisition of territory was that of Florida, by *Mr. Monroe*, in 1819. This, it is true, was comparatively a small addition; being only 59,268 square miles. But it was, in its results, in this respect, substantially the same as the first. For this territory, *Mr. Monroe*, under the treaty with Spain of February 22, 1819, paid, in the form of indemnifications to our own citizens for Spanish spoliation, some \$5,000,000. Yet, we find that the expenditures of his Administration which, that year, (before the \$5,000,000 were paid,) were \$16,300,273, were *reduced* the next year to \$13,134,530; still lower the next year, to \$10,723,479; and lower still the next year, to \$9,827,643. Thus showing that this acquisition, although it required partial military occupation, the establishment of a territorial government, and the payment of \$5,000,000, was followed by a *reduction*, instead of an increase of expenditures—a reduction averaging nearly \$2,000,000 per annum!

The annexation of Texas, our third acquisition, was in March, 1845, at the close of *Mr. Tyler's* administration. By this, we added 325,520 square miles to our territorial possessions. *Mr. Polk* came into office and found this great acquisition to provide for. Under his Administration, as is well known, this was not attended by any material increase of expenditures. This is seen in the fact that the expenditures of the last year of *Mr. Tyler's* administration, (1844,) including the public debt, were \$33,642,010; whereas those of *Mr. Polk's* first year were only \$29,968,206; the annual average of public debt incurred by *Mr. Tyler* being \$10,724,327, and the amount paid by him \$7,007,429; and that incurred by *Mr. Polk* being \$11,733,974, and that paid by him \$7,189,315. The two Administrations being about equal in these respects; and, striking the balance between them upon these averages, showing the administration of *Mr. Polk*, in its first year, to have *reduced* the total expenditures of the Government \$2,871,043, below those of the last year of *Mr. Tyler's*.

I am aware it has been said, and it may be objected here, that the expenses of the war with

Mexico are chargeable to the annexation of Texas. Such a position, however, is wholly untenable, upon any principle of truth or fairness. No one can pretend to hold such a position except those who assume that, in annexing Texas, *we* violated both the national and moral law; and that "the act of Mexico," which the Congress solemnly declared to be the cause of war between the two countries, was a righteous act on her part. Will any one now assume that? He who admits (and who will now deny?) that we had the political and moral right to consummate the annexation of Texas—then an independent Republic—and that, in repelling and punishing the hostile intrusion of Mexico upon *our own soil*, we performed a necessary and patriotic duty, must also admit that, although the war *followed* annexation, it was not as a necessary or legitimate consequence. That war was the consequence of an unwarranted aggression, by a foreign nation, upon the lives and property of our people, which was forced upon us; and we could no more avoid such a consequence, in 1846, with Mexico, than we could, or did, in 1812, with Great Britain. Nor can the expenses of it be charged, with any more real propriety to the annexation of Texas, than could those of the war of 1812 be charged to the purchase of Louisiana. Each of those acquisitions was *followed* by a war; but not as a consequence, either necessary or legitimate. Each resulted from unwarranted aggressions upon the rights of our citizens, and the sacredness of our soil; and as, in either case, we had done no wrong, so in neither is the duty we rightfully performed, justly chargeable with the cost of another's wrong. The expenses of a war with France or England, which *might* have followed annexation, would have been as fairly chargeable to that act, as are those of the war with Mexico, which *did* follow it. We had committed no aggression upon Mexico. Before annexation, we were in the course of demanding and receiving from her the payment of her acknowledged indebtedness to our citizens, for spoliation upon their property, and she seized upon annexation as a pretext to violate her treaty obligations, and refuse to continue that payment. It was, doubtless, to give color to that pretext, and cover her real purpose, that she blustered of war, and ventured to invade a portion of our territory, which she deemed us unprepared to defend. Thus forced into a war, we pursued the wise and rightful policy of "carrying it into the enemy's country;" and there we continued it, until we obtained "indemnity for the past, and security for the future." For this, we stand not only vindicated by the approval of our own people, but justified before the world.

And this brings me to the last and, perhaps, greatest extension of our territory. Under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, we acquired California, &c., amounting to 526,070 square miles, which, added to our former possessions in Oregon, give us all we desire, and full command, of the north Pacific coast. This concession alone not only relieves annexation from all charge of the war, but, in the estimation of all, fully compensates us (without counting the gold of California) for all the expenses of the war itself.

From these facts, which are incontrovertible, the inference is obvious and conclusive, that while a Government, in the course of time, with increasing possessions and population, must in some degree increase its expenditures, yet the ratio of their



increase need not even *equal* that of territory or population. On the contrary, the largest acquisitions of territory, with a rapidly-increasing population, even during a period of eight years together, may be, and, under proper administrations, have been, attended and followed by a considerable *reduction* of expenditures. What, then, I repeat, becomes of the argument of those who would explain and excuse an increase of expenditure *ten times* beyond that of territory, and more than *three times* beyond that even of population, upon the ground that we have extended our territory and augmented our population? What are we to think of a course of policy which involves such an increase of expenditures? And what are we to anticipate as the destiny of a Government which adopts or even tolerates such a policy? And especially just now, what opinion shall we form of an Administration, and what shall be our course towards it, when we find it, in a time of profound peace, and not adding an acre to our territorial possessions, yet going beyond any preceeding Administration in expenditure, increasing the already excessive ratio—going mad with extravagance? Is there no ground for complaint of mismanagement and mal-administration? Is there no occasion for the alarm I have expressed for the welfare and safety of our Government? Is there not good cause to demand that an Administration like the present, which has proved itself not merely incompetent, but extravagant, wasteful, and unfaithful to a degree that the public interests cannot be regarded as safe in its hands, shall be hurled from its place of power?

It is a remarkable and significant fact in the history of our Government, that all our wars have occurred during *Republican* or *Democratic* Administrations; and connected with, and in part proved by it, is the other and most important fact, that those have been the *most economical* Administrations of the Government—that is, they have invariably made their expenditures less than corresponding *Federal* or *Whig* Administrations.

Thus, the war of 1812 was the main cause of the large expenditures of *Mr. Madison's* administration. His whole administration (of eight years) averaged an annual expenditure of \$18,085,618; of which, on account of the war, the Army and Navy consumed \$15,829,127; leaving only \$2,256,491 for his civil administration, which was actually less, by \$10,914 per annum, than *Mr. Jefferson's* very economical administration; which itself had just reduced the expenditures of the Federal administration of the elder *Adams* some \$200,000 a year, and, at the same time, adding five hundred and fifty-eight thousand three hundred and eighty-six square miles to our territorial possessions. Indeed, even with preparations for the war, which was for some time obviously inevitable, the average expenditure of *Mr. Madison's* first three years was not a million more than that of *Mr. Jefferson's* whole administration. And following *Mr. Madison*, we find *Mr. Monroe* at once reducing the expenditures for the Army more than \$7,000,000, for the Navy about \$1,500,000, and the total more than \$3,000,000 a year; although he paid off some \$2,000,000 a year of the public debt more than the preceding Administration; and had, as a consequence of restored peace, to increase the expense of "foreign intercourse" nearly threefold.

During the administration of *General Washington*, the average expenditures for the Army and Navy together, were \$1,272,371 per annum. *John*

*Adams* followed him, and during his short term, increased them up to \$4,026,881, or more than *threefold*. But *Mr. Jefferson*, following him, reduced them down again to \$2,870,195, or a little more than half of those of *Adams*. And, as I have before shown, while *Adams's* annual average for all branches of the public service, was \$5,337,087, or nearly three times as much as *Washington's*; yet *Jefferson* kept his average down actually \$200,000 (or, adding the interest he paid on the Louisiana purchase, \$537,500) less than that of *Adams*.

*Madison's* expenditures, as we have seen, were made large by the war; in his first three years (before the war) having expended less, even, than *Jefferson*.

*Monroe's* came next, and were much less than his predecessor's, though he purchased Florida, and was, necessarily, subjected to other extraordinary expenses.

*John Quincy Adams* followed him; and, with no war, no acquisition of territory, no extraordinary expenses of Government, reduced the total expenditures only \$400,000; at the same time *increasing* the expenditures for the Navy, about \$500,000.

*General Jackson* followed next; and, although there were, during almost the whole of his long Administration, troublesome and expensive Indian wars, and threatened hostilities with France, which required both the Navy and Army to be kept always active, and ready for service; yet his average increase of expenditure was only \$5,599,615; two millions of which increase was for the payment of revolutionary and other pensions, Indian claims, &c., made necessary by acts of Congress. And, by inspection of table B, in Appendix, it will be found that *Jackson's* annual average of total expenditures (with all the difficulties, obstacles, and embarrassments opposed to him, by the *United States Bank*, then struggling with him for control of the Government) were only \$3,634,532 more than *Adams's* short and peaceful administration.

*Mr. Van Buren* succeeded; and his administration, as we all know, was one marked by a most expensive Indian war, and other extraordinary and unavoidable causes of expense. The Army and Navy alone, during his four years, averaged \$16,916,675; revolutionary and other pensions, were also increased \$500,000; and the Indian Department required an increase of \$2,000,000. Added to these, our foreign relations, from causes not connected with his Administration, became expensive to an extraordinary degree; requiring an *increase* of \$4,000,000 in his first year, and an average annual increase, during his whole term, of \$1,418,654 over that of *Jackson*. These extraordinary, and necessary expenses, amounting together to \$18,835,329 deducted from his average expenditures for all branches of the service, which was \$30,432,450, leaves but \$11,597,121 for his ordinary expenditures, which will be found to be just \$1,028,359 *less* than those of *John Quincy Adams*; and that, too, at a period twelve years later, when our population had greatly increased, and our ordinary expenses might, also, have been expected to increase.

*Harrison* and *Tyler* next came into power—or rather *Tyler*, as *Harrison* died at the end of a month, and before any policy had been adopted; and what was expected and intended under the dictation of *Clay* and the lead of *Webster*, to be an old-fashioned Federal or modern Whig administra-



tion, became, in its essential character, and especially in the score of expenditures, Republican or Democratic. Accordingly, we find that retrenchment was begun and carried through every branch of the public service. The war having ceased, the expenditures for the Army and Navy were reduced \$4,875,868; and for foreign intercourse, &c., \$1,665,258. And although \$1,799,393 more were paid on the public debt than during the preceding Administration, yet the average annual expenditures, on all accounts, were reduced \$9,816,252.

Mr. Polk came next; and during his first year, (1845,) before the war begun, his expenditures were but \$763,851 more than Tyler's average, although he had to prepare for the war with Mexico, which was impending. Then came the war, however, and with it extraordinary and unavoidable expenses. By retrenching in other branches, under the necessity of giving \$13,579,428 to the Army alone, these expenses were yet kept down to about \$27,000,000 during his second year. Even at the highest, which was in 1847, they never exceeded \$56,000,000; and in 1848, the last of the war, they were brought down to less than \$43,000,000; his annual average for the four years being only \$36,708,601. Under the circumstances, engaged in an expensive foreign war, carried on by land and water, in the enemy's country, and assailed and embarrassed by an envious, unscrupulous, unpatriotic, party opposition at home, it may, with perfect confidence, be claimed that no Government at any period has ever been more economically or faithfully administered than Mr. Polk's; as certainly no Administration was ever more energetic, successful, or brilliant in its policy and results. Its financial policy increased our revenues, at the same time that it reduced the rates, by equalizing the burdens, of taxation. Its foreign policy enlarged, strengthened, and liberalized, to our advantage, our commercial relations with other countries. And its war policy, characterized by prudence and energy, never surpassed at any period of our history, gave us, in the best sense of the terms, "indemnity for the past and security for the future." For, without adding an annual average of more than \$1,000,000 to our public debt, but securing full payment of our citizens' claims for Mexican spoliation, it added an empire to our territorial possessions, measuring 526,070 square miles in extent, and spanning an ocean coast of 1,000 miles; and of a pecuniary, commercial, and political value, which no arithmetician, or economist of the present day can fully estimate. I shall not attempt the task. But this we all can estimate: The whole of it has cost us, in money, all told, only \$165,730,404. And this includes the aggregate expenditures of the Government, in every branch of the service, and on all accounts, for four years, (including even the \$15,896,000 paid to Mexico, and the \$3,000,000 assumed to our own citizens under the treaty of 1848.) This sum, divided by four, gives the annual average of Mr. Polk's expenditures, including every item of expense, military and civil, ordinary and extraordinary, for his whole term, at \$41,432,601. This is the highest amount which the most exacting political opponent can even pretend to charge against him. The *true* amount, as I have before assumed, from the record, is \$36,708,601—or some \$5,000,000 less. It is not three times as much as John Quincy Adams's administration, from 1825 to 1829; only twice as much as General Jackson's,

from 1829 to 1837; only fifty per cent. more than Mr. Van Buren's, from 1837 to 1841; and it is *less*—mark this—absolutely *less*, by \$3,468,429 per annum, than that of the present administration of Mr. Fillmore!

Mr. President, I do not make this statement at random, or without authority. I repeat it, and appeal to the record for its truth. Here is that record before me. It discloses the facts that the expenditures of Mr. Polk's administration, expensive as we know it necessarily was, on account of the three years' war with Mexico, and fruitful as we also know it was in the acquisition of territory, averaged, for its whole term of four years, only \$36,708,601 per annum; whereas, Mr. Fillmore's, in a time of profound peace, and without acquiring an acre of territory, have averaged, during its three years, \$40,177,030 per annum—that is, \$3,468,429 more than Mr. Polk's! These are remarkable facts; and to the country, when they are known, will, I doubt not, be astounding. I confess they astonished me when, upon searching the records, for another and more general purpose, I found them to be as I have here set them down. Are they not of sufficient importance to arrest attention, and command our serious thought? Well, indeed, may the people, who have to pay the taxes to support this enormous extravagance, look to its causes and its consequences.

In his first message, in December, 1849, General Taylor told us that we were "at peace with all the world, and the rest of mankind." And Mr. Fillmore, in his last message, in December, 1851, tells us "our country is at peace with all the world." In assuming, then, that we are in a state of perfect and profound peace, I do so upon the authority of the Administration itself. And it follows, as a consequence, which we all recognize, and can all appreciate, that we neither need, nor have, a large military force in service, nor, necessarily, a very expensive one. So, neither has our Navy been materially increased, nor has it, necessarily, required any increase of expenditure. Then, in our civil service, where has there been any need for much increase of expenditure? I leave others to find out, for I have been unable to discover it. Yet, we do find the aggregate of expenditures not only *not reduced*, upon a restoration of peace, a disbanding of the army, &c., but enormously *increased*! How, and why, is this? I might be satisfied to let the friends of the Administration explain and answer this, if they can; resting, myself, upon the simple statement of the fact, which they neither can nor will deny. But to help them, as far as I can, and to enable the country at large to understand something of this extraordinary state of public affairs, and form a judgment of the administrative competency and fidelity of a portion of their public servants, I will exhibit a few of the items which go to make up the great general fact I have stated. See, compare, and judge of them!

During Mr. Polk's war administration, the expenditures for the civil list, foreign intercourse, &c., averaged only \$6,175,532 per annum; whereas, during Mr. Fillmore's peace administration, for similar purposes, we have had to pay \$15,576,777; that is, nearly three times as much!

During Mr. Polk's war administration, the expenditures for our large army, on war service in a foreign country, averaged \$23,053,600; whereas, during Mr. Fillmore's peace administration, with a mere skeleton of an army, we have had to pay for its mere support, \$15,676,609 per annum! And



this, without counting in the present year, which, as far as can be ascertained, will greatly exceed this large average.

During Mr. Polk's war administration, when the Navy was kept always ready, and the most of it actively engaged in sea service, and at the highest necessary expense, its average expenditure was only \$7,504,468; whereas, during the three years of Mr. Fillmore's peace administration, with many of our ships neither needed nor engaged in active service, it has cost us \$8,896,976 per annum; that is, \$1,392,508 for peace more than for war!

Thus, striking the balance under these three heads alone, we find that Mr. Fillmore's three years "peace with all the world" has cost us, in actual money, just \$3,416,762 per annum more than Mr. Polk's one year of peace and three years of war!—without counting the 526,070 square miles of territory, embracing 1,000 miles of sea-coast, acquired by the war.

It may be attempted, but it cannot be truly said, that, although the current expenses of Mr. Polk's administration were nominally less than Mr. Fillmore's, yet he created large debts, which he did not pay, and which have now to be paid, and make up the enormous amount of Mr. Fillmore's expenditures. A balance of accounts on this score, between the two Administrations, may vary the difference between them somewhat from the precise amounts at which I have stated it; but not so much as to change the general result which I assumed, nor break the force of my charge of enormous extravagance against the present Administration.

To show that I am right in this, let us look at the items of that account: During Mr. Polk's administration, of four years, the annual average of the public debt created by him was \$11,733,974; while the annual average amount of the same debt paid by him was \$7,189,315; leaving an annual balance against him of \$4,544,659—that is, an aggregate for his whole term of \$17,508,782, or about the amount (including some \$200,000 of interest) which has since been paid to Mexico, under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. But adding this whole amount to that already charged to his Administration, and it carries his annual average up to \$40,886,237; which is only \$709,207 more than I have heretofore stated Mr. Fillmore's to be.

A similar statement for Mr. Fillmore's administration shows that he has created for his three years an annual public debt of \$10,878,233; while the annual average amount of the same debt paid by him has been \$9,369,451, leaving an annual balance against him of \$1,508,782—that is, counting his full term of four years, and in liberality to him assuming no more for this year than the average of the other three, an aggregate of \$6,035,128. This, added to his other expenditures, as in the case of Mr. Polk, carries Mr. Fillmore's annual average up to \$41,685,812, which still leaves him, upon a final balance of cash accounts, chargeable with expenditures \$799,575 more than Mr. Polk!

But this, it will be perceived, is not dealing fairly with Mr. Polk's administration, upon the rule adopted in estimating and comparing the expenditures of all preceding Administrations. I have, in this particular estimate, done this unfairness to Mr. Polk, that the friends of this Administration should not have even a semblance of a pretext for complaint; and to show that even then the balance was in his favor against Mr. Fillmore. To state the account fairly, however, as in the cases of all the

other Administrations, the whole public debt must be excluded, as well for Mr. Polk as for Mr. Fillmore, and this leaves the difference as I originally and fairly stated it—that is, a balance *against* Mr. Fillmore of \$3,468,429 per annum!

It is not my present purpose to pursue this subject further, in detail, than I have already gone; for I feel that I have wearied the Senate, as I certainly have exhausted my own strength. Nor was it my purpose or expectation, when I began this research into the financial history of our Government, to make the results I might develop, the means, or this the occasion, of special assault upon the present Administration. My purpose was a more general and important one, as, in a preceding part of my remarks, I have made manifest. That purpose was to show the tendency of our Government to increase its expenditures, at a rate which was fearful in its rapidity. My anticipations, alarming from even the superficial examination I had before given to the subject, have, in the course of the investigation, been most painfully realized—nay, greatly exceeded; for not only have I found, and disclosed to the Senate, in facts and figures, which cannot mislead, that this increase of expenditures is fearfully rapid, but must be absolutely ruinous in its consequences, considered even in its financial aspect, unless speedily arrested. I have disclosed the important and significant facts, which no man can controvert, and which no patriotic statesman can disregard, that, while our territory has increased *not quite threefold*, and our population *not quite sixfold*, in the course of sixty years; yet, that, within that period, our *taxes* have increased *more than eightfold*, and our *expenditures*, for ordinary current Administration, *more than twentyfold*! And that, at this rate of *expenditure*, (a hundred per cent. every period of twelve years,) it would amount, in 1864, to \$104,000,000; in 1876, to \$208,000,000; in 1888, to \$416,000,000; and, by the close of the century, now not fifty years to come, to \$832,000,000!

The past, as I have presented it, is but the page of our official records, as it lies open for inspection. The present is not only palpable to our eyes, but it is ringing in our ears, in the demands of a wasteful and remorseless Administration, which seems to expend the public money, but for an excuse to renew its cries for MORE! And all this points to a *future*, which is gaping at our feet, and yearning to engulf us; and from which, because I would warn you away, or hold you back, I already hear myself called a *demagogue*, or some other name, even more opprobrious than that. Be it so. I have but told you the truth, and furnished the proof of it. I have acted from a sense of duty, so far, and have nothing to regret, save that I have found the evil of the times so great, and my ability so poor to correct it. In the future, I shall "cry aloud, and spare not," until the evil be corrected, or until it gathers strength enough to overwhelm us all in a common ruin.

If the investigation into which my general purposes have led me, has disclosed facts which condemn the Administration of Mr. Fillmore, the fault is his, not mine. If I have sought to give some special point to the application of those facts, as exemplifying the dangerous principles, and exposing the ruinous policy of the *Whig party*, it has all come about so naturally, and is so palpable to observation, that I must be blind indeed, not to find in it, the *political death-warrant* of that party. And I should be derelict in my duty if I did not



hold that death-warrant up, that all who run may read it. And, while I claim to be by no means sanguinary in my disposition, and am, in general, opposed to capital punishments, I must possess far more political good nature than any man should have, if, with such a warrant in my hand, I could forbear demanding, in the name of DEMOCRACY, that *Millard Fillmore*, and the *Whig party*, of which he has been the fit and favorite representative, and is the present true imbodiment, in all the misdeeds the record proves against him, be taken from their places of power, on the first Thursday of November next, and hung by the neck until they be *politically dead!*

But, Mr. President, while I say all this, which is the naked truth, of *Millard Fillmore* and his administration, and, in the name of *Democracy*, write upon these walls that he and his partisans, having been "weighed in the balance and found wanting," shall be hurled from power; I would not be understood as alleging that, as a politician, *Mr. Fillmore*, bad as he is, has been particularly criminal, or that his misdeeds, numerous and outrageous as they have been, are peculiar to himself. I regard him as the representative of the *Whig party*, and his Administration as the practical exemplification of *Whig principles*. It is one of the fundamental principles of that party, that as much money should be collected from the people, in the form of taxes, as they can be made to pay; and that the money, so collected, should be so expended as most to extend and strengthen the power and patronage of the Federal Executive. That party starting out, originally, under the name of *Federal*, next assuming that of *National Republican*, and now known as *Whig*, has always held this principle; and the hasty, though accurate, glance I have here taken of its administrative career, whenever it has chanced to acquire power, from the beginning down to the present time, discloses the strongly-marked, and incontrovertible proof, that its administration of the Government has always been governed by that principle. In the past, this has always been the case; and, as a consequence—indeed as a necessary

means of safety—the people have been compelled to drive this party from power, at the end of every four years, when they had been trusted with it. In the instance now before us, this bad principle has been most boldly avowed, and fearfully exemplified. To prove this, look to the course and results of *Mr. Fillmore's* administration, as I have laid them before you. In all he has done, however—in his disregard and contempt of law—his gross and glaring usurpation of power—his wasteful and licentious extravagance—I repeat, he is but the representative of his party—the embodiment of *Whig principles*; and his Administration has been just what any other *Whig* Administration would have been—just what it always will be, and must be, while Whiggery exists, and the people permit it to remain in power.

To correct the evil of the times, then, of which we complain; to arrest the tendency of the Government to consolidation; to reform the abuses and corruptions of Executive power and patronage; to relieve the people from unequal and burdensome taxes; to restore the Administration to republican simplicity, purity, and economy; and thus give to our institutions the firm foundation, perpetuity, and beneficence which our heaven-inspired fathers of the Revolution designed they should have; we must make war upon the *principle* I have named, as the root of the evil, and strike down the professors of that principle wherever we may find them.

*Mr. Fillmore* is now the standard-bearer of that flag which bears that principle as its motto. Strike now at him. And when he falls, whether by our blows, or from his own inherent weakness; and another arm, whether civil or military, seeks to raise the same flag, as surely another will; then strike still, and fast, and hard, at that flag and that arm, until they both go down, as go down they must, as they have ever gone down, before the united blows of the Democracy. Such has been the experience, of our fathers. Such shall be our experience; such the good fortune of our country, if we be but true to her interest and her honor.



APPENDIX.

(A.)—Statement of the Receipts of the United States from 1789 to 1851, inclusive. Annual average during each Administration.

Administration.	Customs.	Internal revenue.	Direct taxes.	Postage.	Public lands.	Dividends and sales of bank stocks, &c.	Miscellaneous.	Receipts exclusive of loans, Treas. notes, &c.	Loans & Treasury notes.	Total receipts.
Washington .....	\$3,633,170 62	\$204,222 88	†	\$16,976 10	\$604 51	\$218,750 00	\$10,746 58	\$4,083,220 71	\$2,525,860 64	\$6,609,081 35
John Adams .....	7,846,773 40	702,095 59	\$183,555 99	55,750 00	23,986 86	151,806 00	42,242 94	8,746,209 80	1,763,947 81	10,510,157 61
Jefferson .....	13,072,531 87	249,895 50	124,315 62	27,937 77	428,637 30	177,045 00	94,741 34	14,175,104 42	25,606 22	14,200,710 64
Madison .....	12,620,567 82	1,436,147 65	1,083,512 90	56,233 15	983,379 62	†	104,944 68	16,284,785 85	13,740,913 12	30,025,698 97
Monroe .....	18,288,740 35	285,076 02	285,076 03	7,151 10	1,803,196 80	426,863 18	137,860 86	21,456,993 92	1,723,344 29	23,180,338 21
John Quincy Adams	21,589,463 03	21,174 62	3,453 83	222 71	1,281,007 41	411,250 00	401,249 73	23,707,821 35	1,250,000 00	24,957,821 35
Jackson .....	23,167,844 16	7,876 51	6,377 35	243 95	7,267,598 95	527,986 24	529,744 15	31,507,671 35	†	31,507,671 35
Van Buren .....	15,991,379 43	3,049 17	610 73	†	5,056,727 23	1,923,145 36	2,554,793 60	25,165,009 79	6,289,158 43	31,454,168 22
Harrison and Tyler*.	16,476,385 08	1,159 23	†	†	1,414,795 71	182,420 47	519,209 12	18,594,219 64	10,724,327 54	29,318,547 18
Polk .....	27,436,434 04	†	†	†	2,649,618 13	†	176,933 21	30,262,980 14	11,733,974 81	41,996,954 95
Taylor and Fillmore†	39,010,931 05	†	†	†	1,967,053 03	†	1,276,324 67	42,254,375 42	10,878,233 00	53,132,608 42

\* Harrison lived only one month, and was succeeded by Tyler, whose administration was, in great part, especially towards its close, Democratic.  
† Taylor lived some sixteen months, and was succeeded

(B.)—Statement of the Expenditures of the United States, from 1789 to 1851, inclusive. Annual average during each Administration.

Administration.	Civil list, foreign intercourse, and miscellaneous.	Military service.	Revolutionary & other pensions.	Indian Department.	Naval establishment.	Expenditures exclusive of public debt.	Public debt—paid.	Total expenditures.
Washington .....	\$633,152 35	\$1,105,503 34	\$79,507 62	\$27,251 72	\$106,768 29	\$1,986,337 31	\$4,511,619 61	\$6,497,956 92
John Adams .....	1,186,236 50	2,019,187 67	89,169 26	24,799 97	2,017,694 38	5,337,087 79	4,739,490 67	10,076,578 46
Jefferson .....	2,049,057 69	1,334,528 63	77,346 85	141,150 00	1,535,665 33	5,137,598 58	8,148,299 81	13,285,898 39
Madison .....	1,899,201 40	11,287,490 44	96,707 27	260,608 01	4,541,637 99	18,085,618 10	10,428,617 19	28,514,235 29
Monroe .....	3,295,303 51	4,596,847 73	1,535,417 78	438,360 24	3,181,996 91	13,045,438 69	12,670,763 90	25,716,202 59
John Quincy Adams ..	2,934,562 96	3,671,907 74	1,173,029 20	733,315 84	3,862,662 55	12,625,480 82	11,325,883 35	23,951,364 17
Jackson .....	4,259,584 28	6,263,460 29	2,182,365 78	1,701,285 63	3,980,375 24	18,224,095 91	9,361,800 48	27,585,896 39
Van Buren .....	7,193,858 70	10,648,054 99	2,643,633 10	3,678,234 91	6,268,621 55	30,432,450 29	5,208,036 07	35,640,486 36
Harrison and Tyler...	5,528,600 62	5,884,750 96	1,659,603 98	1,387,210 04	6,156,057 64	20,616,198 70	7,007,429 76	27,623,628 13
Polk .....	6,175,532 96	23,053,600 24	1,767,815 22	1,163,564 56	7,504,468 18	36,708,601 39	7,189,315 12	43,897,916 51
Taylor and Fillmore...	15,576,777 62	15,676,609 45	1,647,746 68	1,828,084 01	8,896,976 35	40,177,030 00	*15,265,451 63	55,442,481 00

by Fillmore, who is now President. Three years of this term—one of Taylor's, and two of Fillmore's—only are included in these estimates; as the returns for 1852 can be made up, and certainly known only at the close of the year. These now given embrace all that are known. In ascertaining the average, therefore, the aggregate is divided by three. The average would be still larger, if returns for the whole term could be ascertained and divided by four.

† The several blanks thus marked (†) result, in some instances, from defective returns. In other instances, from changes in the law; and, in some others, from causes which will be readily appreciated. Thus, during the last three Administrations, there have been no direct taxes levied; during the four last, no excess of postages over Post Office expenditures; during the last two, no connection with the banks, &c.; and during General Jackson's whole term, there was no money raised on loans or Treasury notes.

\* This includes the average annual amounts of \$5,896,000, paid to Mexico under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.